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 I. ABSTRACT 
he introduction of Information Governance throughout 
the NHS in Great Britain from 2004 onwards, saw Pri-
mary Care Medicine subject to a regulatory regime 
aligning current practice with codes, ethics, legislation and 
standards. However the Information Commissioners Office, 
as regulator of Healthcare Data Controllers, has issued statu-
tory Undertakings to stem the tide of continued leakage of 
sensitive health data. Drawing on research from America, the 
issue of IT Security Risk is presented as problematic given 
the limitations of surveys indentifying industry trends and is 
viewed beyond the traditional Threat Value Asset Matrix 
towards a framework incorporating the reasonable man – 
taking all due care and diligence as is reasonably practicable 
in the circumstances. Following the identification of major 
problems across 10% of English general practices in comply-
ing with both Confidentiality and Data Protection Assurance, 
and Information Security Assurance, a national survey of GP 
Practices was undertaken to investigate security incidents and 
risk. Contemporaneous to this, information on reported unto-
ward security incidents was obtained from the regulator and 
all Health Boards across Scotland.  Together, these results 
identified actual risk to securing patient data and concerns 
voiced from within the sector. This may be of relevance to 
practitioners, managers as well as policy makers particularly 
where changes to the structure of the NHS are proposed. 
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II. DATA LEAKAGE AS A PROBLEM AREA 
The forward to the Information Governance Program Plan 
2008-2011 provides a succinct review of the aims of govern-
ment policy as the NHS moves toward integrated IT Systems 
and an electronic Health Record (Scottish Government, 
2008). Information processing must occur to the benefit of 
patients in a secure and confidential environment which 
meets all regulatory, quality, legal and ethical obligations. 
This must meet the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability 
(CIA) triad- data must remain confidential, its integrity must 
be ensured and it must be both accurate and available to those 
authorised to receive it (Kolkowska, Hedstrom, & Karlsson, 
2009). In the US the move to a fully integrated e-Health sys-
tem has been estimated to improve efficiency and reduce 
costs, saving some $81bn (Appari & Johnson, 2009). The 
coalition government recently announced a paradigm shift in 
the provision of Health Care in the UK with proposals to re-
move Primary Care Trusts in England and giving full fiscal 
independence to general practices (Department of Health, 
2010d). 
 Given the sensitive nature of personal health data and the 
sheer size of the NHS, the largest employer in Europe with 
1.3 million staff (NHS Careers, 2010), it is hardly surprising 
the media are replete with examples of data leakage. These 
include reports of one in ten hospitals having insecure IT 
Systems (BJHCIM, 2010a), loss of a USB stick containing 
patient data found in a car park (BJHCIM, 2010 b), an aver-
age loss of around 835 patient records every day within the 
NHS (Doyle, 2010), IT Professionals Failing in IT Security 
(BJHCIM , 2010 c), and even spending six weeks locating a 
memory card missing from the medical photographers office 
at the Sick Kids Hospital in Edinburgh (Morris, 2010).  
 Within the UK the Office of the Information Commis-
sioner (Information Commissioner, 2010) is charged by 
parliament with regulating the processing of data. The Data 
Protection Act 1998 defines identifiable personal data (IPD), 
as sensitive where this contains health, or details of union 
activity, political preferences, religious inclinations or sexual 
proclivities (Crown, 1998). This is consistent with its prede-
cessor the 1984 Act (Crown, 1984). As such sensitive data 
should be subject to a stricter processing regime.   
 Despite the benefits of an integrated e-Health strategy, the 
Information Commissioner reported the Healthcare sector 
accounts for some of the largest number of complaints. In-
deed, of all the undertakings entered into to ensure 
compliance in the last few years, the majority were issued to 
the Health Sector (Information Commissioner, 2010). Table 1 
provides a breakdown of these undertakings. 
 Most notable amongst these undertakings is the large 
number of data leakages arising from hospitals rather than GP 
Practices. Of the undertakings issued, two were to GP’s (Of-
fice Information Commissioner, 2009). From an analysis of 
all the undertakings, it appears basic physical security sys-
tems were absent (devices secured to desks) or basic 
measures to prevent unauthorised access were missing (pass-
word protected encrypted data). The volume and type of data 
affected ranged from patient details through to staff records.  
III. THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSING RISK TO DATA 
Several fundamental flaws have been highlighted in current 
IT Security Risk assessment methods (Parker D., 2006) (Mat-
tord H. , 2007). These are based around an economic analysis 
of Threat Vulnerability Asset (TVA) in order to determine 
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the optimal security investment (Gordon & Loeb, 2002). 
Firstly assets are identified and an asset value associated to it. 
Secondly for every asset potential threats are identified. At 
this stage an estimate of the probability of the threat occur-
ring is made as well as an estimate of the loss incurred if the 
threat materialises. The third stage is to estimate the annual-
ised loss expectancy (ALE). This is the cumulative value of 
all threats affecting the asset. 
 However, reports of occurrence of a risk may not be 
based upon large populations but on inconsistent reporting 
over differing populations and in altogether different indus-
trial sectors with diverse opinions on threat to their assets 
(Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010). Underlying all of this is 
the problem of reluctance to report. With no consistent statu-
tory notification scheme the datasets may be skewed.  
 A survey of IT Security practitioners in 2006, albeit rather 
small, provided some indication that many managers estimate 
en element of the ALE calculation (Mattord H., 2007). Inter-
estingly 74% indicated compliance with regulations drove the 
risk assessment approach.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX), The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) were most influential in the compliance environ-
ment. Over half of the respondents indicated they were reliant 
upon compulsory regulation to a large degree.  
 The alternative approach espoused by Mattord and others 
is due diligence, compliance and business enablement. This is 
taking all steps as is reasonably practicable (a precept nor-
mally associated with common law based jurisdictions) to 
meet the standards defined in voluntary codes, codes ap-
proved by regulators or legislation.  
IV. RISK AND REGULATION IN THE AMERICAN HEALTHCARE 
SECTOR 
Within the Healthcare sector, compliance with the HIPAA 
regulations, coming into effect in April 2005, has produced 
some interesting results. In a 2006 survey, only 25% of hos-
pitals across the USA were found to comply with the security 
regulations. This prompted research in 2008 and 2009 at the 
prestigious Dartmouth College, into the extent to which hos-
pitals met the requirements of the Privacy, Security and 
Transaction Rules (Appari, Anthony, & Johnson, 2008). The 
methodology used in these studies was to review a database 
of hospital information including perceived compliance from 
senior managers. A second database was used to identify IT 
Leaders demonstrating good practice.  Both databases were 
combined to produce IT Leaders within the Healthcare field 
and nationally gathered information on the Hospitals them-
selves. The status of the hospital determined whether further 
regulation applied such as Sarbanes Oxley Act which re-
quires the implementation of COBIT.  
 The more recent 2009 study attempted to identify the ef-
fect of institutional and market forces on compliance. Thus 
external pressure from regulation (coercive), copying com-
petitive rivals (mimetic) and industry best practice from 
external consultants (norms) influence compliance levels 
(Appari, Anthony, & Johnson, 2009). Whilst both studies 
identified characteristics of hospitals with high levels of 
HIPAA compliance the major flaw in the research was the 
data set used dated from 2003 and therefore did not portray 
an accurate picture of current compliance.   
V. RISK AND REGULATION IN THE BRITISH HEALTHCARE 
SECTOR  
The Department of Health has worked closely with the Royal 
College of General Practitioners to establish standards gov-
erning the processing of patient data (Department of Health 
& Royal College of General Practitioners, 2005). Generally, 
the NHS approach to IT Security in Primary Care has been to 
encase this as a small element within a wider Information 
Governance Framework (NHS Connecting for Health, 2009). 
The raison d’être of the framework was to provide a mecha-
nism whereby Regulations (statute law including the Data 
Protection Act 1998, statutory instruments, orders, case law), 
Standards (Professional and Ethical) and Good Practice (NHS 
Executive letters, directions and guidance notes) could be 
enforced throughout the largest employer in Western Europe.   
In Primary Care there are a number of elements which GP’s 
must satisfy in order to demonstrate good governance (De-
partment of Health, 2007) (Department of Health, 2010 a). 
These criteria fall within the scope of three major areas: In-
formation Governance Management, Confidentiality and 
Data Protection Assurance, and Information Security Assur-
ance.  
 Practices were obliged to complete their Information 
Governance self-assessment before 31st March 2010. Every 
practice must attain a predetermined number of key require-
ments to achieve an overall green rating of 70% in each area. 
An analysis of 10% of the publically available results for 
England, some 800 practices revealed the nature of the risks 
to Patient data.  Nearly 40% of practices failed to meet the 
government set standards for Information Security Assur-
ance. In terms of Confidentiality and Data Protection 
compliance, some 55% failed to attain a green rating. In 
April, the Information Commissioner was granted the powers 
to impose fines of up to £500,000 for data security breaches. 
Facing the potential of crippling fines and poor governance 
results in England are Scottish Practices any better? 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Information Governance compliance in England 
  
Source: Analysis of results 2009-10 from 10% of GP prac-
tices in England (Department of Health, 2010 c) 
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VI. THE 2010 SCOTTISH SURVEY 
An online questionnaire was issued to all Health Boards 
(1,082 practices) in Scotland with two refusing to participate. 
This reduced the population to 837 practices. Contemporane-
ous to this, requests under the Freedom of Information Act 
were similarly issued to all Health Boards requiring details of 
all reported IT Security incidents during the last few years. 
The majority of respondents to the survey were practice man-
agers. Thus managers in 84 (10.05%) of the sample 
population of 837 practices responded.  
 
1) IT Security in Scottish practices: Main Findings 
Eighty percent of practices retain their own databases of pa-
tient data. Interestingly, 21% of practice managers indicated 
they were not registered as data controllers. It is recom-
mended practice managers check with the online list of 
registered data controllers to confirm they are currently regis-
tered. As this is a strict statutory liability offence, it was 
expected all practices were already registered. This may be 
simply due to the senior partner registering the practice rather 
than the practice manager. 
 The Information Commissioner, in the latest Annual Re-
port to Parliament, drew attention to Health Boards and PCT 
had experienced theft of laptops and PC’s. Therefore it was 
deemed important to investigate whether devices which could 
be easily stolen were encrypted. Nearly 2/3rd of practice 
managers indicated encrypted laptops were used in the prac-
tice. A similar figure used fully encrypted desktop systems 
within their practice. 
 Whilst most health boards have mandated the use of fully 
encrypted USB devices it should be noted less than three per-
cent of practice managers indicated USB devices were used 
to transfer patient records. It is recommended that practice 
managers ensure where they do use USB devices these are 
fully encrypted.  
 It is reassuring to read the most common forms of trans-
ferring patient records are via secure systems (NHS email, 
courier, GPEX). There is virtually no use of USB devices or 
CD/DVD’s to transfer data. In light of this it is unlikely a 
repeat of the HMRC debacle where entire data sets of mil-
lions of records on DVD went missing.  
 Data is shared with secondary care professionals. Few 
practices transfer the entire electronic patient record. Most 
sharing occurs via secure methods, the SCI gateway being 
most popular. NHS email is predominately used. However ¾ 
transfer details with secondary care professionals via tele-
phone. Almost two thirds use faxes to transfer details.  
 In terms of awareness of relevant codes and legislation 
there was a higher awareness of confidentiality, Data Protec-
tion and Freedom of Information legislation than other codes. 
Over half (59%) of practices indicated they were aware of 
Good Practice Guidelines for GP’s. A similar number were 
aware of the NHS Information Security Policy (60%) and 
Records Management NHS Code of Practice (64.4%).  
 Most practices were aware of how they could contact the 
Information Governance lead within their practices for advice 
and guidance. However 40% did not know how to contact the 
IT Security Officer (ITSO) within the Primary Care Trust. 
The ITSO within the PCT is able to provide a degree of com-
puter security expertise to practices.  
2) Results-Security Incidents 
Reassuringly the bulk of practices (nearly ¾) indicated they 
have not suffered an IT Security incident effecting the secu-
rity or confidentiality of patient data. A small percentage 
(16.5%) indicated they did experience an incident. When 
investigated further the vast majority (90%) suffered less than 
five incidents. According to the categories defined in the 
NHS IT Security manual, these were Minor (affecting an 
isolated individual). Where an incident occurred this was 
reported to the senior partner in almost all cases.  No incident 
resulted in financial damage.  
 An analysis of the security incident identified the most 
common being unauthorised individuals accessing data. Only 
one practice each respectively, defined a security incident 
they suffered as arising as a result of either a virus infecting 
machines, failure to dispose of paper or electronic records 
correctly, or failure to ensure backup data was adequate or 
passwords being shared between users. All practices which 
indicated they suffered a security incident implemented a 
plan to resolve security weaknesses within one month.  
  
3) Results- Risk Assessment 
Nearly half (48%) of practices performed a risk assessment. 
Nearly a third did not know if a risk assessment had taken 
place. Where a risk assessment was performed a fifth used a 
senior partner, a quarter the IG lead.  The PCT IT Security 
Officer was used by one practice as was the information asset 
administrator. No practice used an IT Consultant.  
 Only one practice indicated they used CRAMM as the 
risk analysis method. No use was made of either ITSEC or 
SAFE. The remainder indicated the risk analysis method used 
was unknown. Interestingly, no practice sought advice or 
guidance on IT Security from reviewing the BS7799 stan-
dards or NHS Security Manual controls matrix. A quarter 
indicated they referred to the Risk Analysis and Risk Man-
agement volume of the NHS Security Manual. Most used 
other sources of guidance. The bulk of practices (75%) would 
like more training or support with IT Security and informa-
tion governance. 
 
4) Results- Greatest Risk to Systems and Data 
Practice Managers perceived the greatest risk to securing 
their IT Systems and patient data came from insecure ex-
changes of data with secondary care professionals or clerical 
staff being unaware or their roles and responsibilities. Over 
half of practices perceived some of the lowest risks to arise 
from insider abuse, unauthorised access to systems, or loss of 
data via portable devices (USB, PDA or phone).  
 It was indicated by the majority of practices were most 
confident with exchanging data with other Scottish GP’s, 
hospitals or labs. Least confidence was expressed where data 
was exchanged with pharmacies, researchers or secondary 
care professionals.  
 
5) Results-Current Threats to Security of Systems 
Practice Managers felt there were a number of threats to the 
security of IT Systems and patient data. These could be clas-
sified as Security, Transfers and Training. In terms of 
Security, the sharing of passwords between staff, staff failing 
to logout of systems leaving an unattended logged in system, 
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and maintaining lists of multiple passwords to many systems 
were the most common perceived security threat. A single 
login may alleviate this problem whilst providing a reliable 
audit trail. Transfers of data via fax were seen as a major 
threat as errors can easily lead to data being sent to the wrong 
person. Training was an issue covering a range of threats 
reported by a few practices each. This includes better training 
to ensure staff conversations could not be overheard, raising 
the awareness of Data Protection responsibilities amongst 
staff and training to ensure staff do not leave paper based 
records lying in the open where they could be viewed or sto-
len.  
 
6) Results- Main Challenges  
The main challenges facing General Practice in the next two 
years were varied. Primarily this was how increasingly inte-
grated systems could be secured to ensure only appropriate 
personnel gained access to data without any leakage. A corol-
lary of this was the need for training. However underlying 
these was the perennial problem of funding. Managers felt a 
wider share of the PCT or Health Board funds should be de-
voted to IT in GP surgeries. 
 Importantly several indicated the sheer volume of data 
coming into practices and the many systems GP’s now had to 
access could easily lead to important data being missed. GP’s 
had to action their Docman mail, their EMIS tasks, Lab re-
sults, SCI-Gateway referral box, to find all the information 
for each day.   
 
7) Results- Improvements to enhance IT use in the Prac-
tice 
Hardware, Support and System Design are key areas where 
improvements could enhance the use of IT within practices. It 
was almost universally reported hardware issues was the 
prominent area for improvement. Either machines were old, 
outdated and slow or the external communication links used 
by practices were inadequate.  Again the issue of funding was 
crucial to this. As independent contractors GP’s do not pro-
cure hardware assets or software applications often making 
do with what has been provided by the Health Board. A key 
improvement would be to review IT budgets and purchasing 
regimes.  
 Better support for practices encompassing both IT hard-
ware and training was widely regarded as a key enhancement.  
Training in new applications is often not factored into hosted 
organization’s budget as highly as it ought to. Implementa-
tion of the increasingly e-Health driven agenda does not take 
account of workforce skill mix issues on the ground in pri-
mary care. More widespread training for non Vision users 
was also requested. 
 
8) Results- Enhancements PCT could initiate 
Enhancements to the system produced some worthy areas for 
improvement. A large number of practices requested a single 
unified logon even suggesting finger print or smart card ac-
cess would reduce the wide variety of passwords. To quote a 
practice manager, “Currently I have 12 login's and passwords 
to remember and change every month - too many”.  
Other suggested system improvements included requests for 
better GP2GP transfers for Vision. Specific screens for ad-
ministrative staff to enter details without displaying clinical 
information about patients but would allow clerical staff to 
input administrative information, telephone calls, or ap-
pointment messages. Web based facilities for patients to book 
appointments and request repeat scripts were suggested. The 
facility for user feedback into systems design to facilitate 
rapid improvements and the use of standardized data extrac-
tion software was also suggested.  
 Related to this is improved design of integrated systems. 
This would enable better communications with hospitals, 
easier to transfer patient records from one practice to another, 
labs linking directly into the patient record, and the ability to 
use systems whilst at home to complete outstanding paper-
work or access records whilst on home visits.  
 Whilst a wish list of improvements to enhance the sys-
tems is useful, practice managers considered the PCT could 
better protect patient data. Some suggestions were to ensure 
all communications between sites and departments were en-
crypted; provide a more secure mechanism for sending faxes 
to reduce the risk of human error; to provide a more effective 
education and training regime and improving access to the 
system. This latter element could be used to provide access 
for locums to practices on the day they are needed.  
 Some comments in this area are interesting. One practice 
manager suggested the emphasis be moved from “protecting 
data to systems that can SHARE data safely for the benefit of 
patients. We give too much emphasis to PROTECTING and 
not nearly enough on better ways to SHARE data. This is 
why we see failures in care throughout the UK”.  In order to 
reduce workload and enhance security one practice thought it 
best if the PCT ensure all research data is gathered centrally 
and pass it to researchers. 
 
9) Untoward Security Incidents Reported to Health 
Boards 
Like the concerns raised by the Information Commissioner, a 
clear risk is presented by theft or loss of equipment contain-
ing data. However, a number of incidents were reported 
involving staff sharing logon’s. Breach of existing policies 
accounts for another large number of reported incidents. 
Given the lack of complete data, only eight boards provided 
useable responses, it was not possible to correlate the re-
sponses with organisation status to determine whether 
hospitals or GP Surgeries were the most likely to present data 
risks.  
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Figure 2 Details of Reported Incidents (Obtained by FOI) 
 
I. CONCLUSIONS 
The results may be useful to policy makers and Primary Care 
Staff alike as it provides some guidance for the disbursal of 
scare funds in a tight spending round to provide cost effective 
methods of ensuring compliance, protecting sensitive health 
data and avoiding hefty fines.  The English IG results provide 
some background in which reasoned decisions can be made:  
over 50% failing to meet green standard in Confidentiality, 
Data Protection and nearly, 40% failing in Security. This is 
despite over two decades of legislation in the field and seven 
versions of information governance. There were examples of 
good practice. These include the introduction of encrypted 
laptops throughout the Board area (NHS Grampian), contact-
ing effected individuals after incidents (NHS Lothian even 
won an award), banning USB devices (NHS Forth Valley).  
 The results provide an insight into the current industry 
view of risk. The low level of risk analysis and limited use of 
standard IT Security Risk Analysis Methods, demonstrate a 
movement away from risk as the sole measurement of suc-
cess. The IG framework places little emphasis on risk 
assessment (two out of several criteria refer to this), this itself 
supports Mattord and Parkers view. Regulatory compliance 
should be the goal. It is interesting both authors refer to due 
diligence.  
  Whilst there will always be the ever present threat of 
theft or loss of equipment it is paramount data on all devices 
be encrypted and password protected. The possibility of an 
immense fine of £500,000 for data security breaches may 
prompt better compliance. The threat of such a sanction may 
redress the current drift to ensure the reaction is a higher level 
of regulatory compliance. However, only better awareness 
and training can ensure all data held within Primary Care is 
encrypted and password protected. Before the PCT tier is 
removed from the NHS Structure in England consideration 
should be applied to ensuring how the governance standards 
can be attained and patient data secured amongst independent 
contractors who currently face difficulties in compliance. 
Perhaps we should take heed of Ross Anderson, professor at 
the Cambridge University Computing Laboratory who when 
commenting upon plans to allow thousands, inside and out-
side the NHS, access to the summary care record:    “We do 
need to automate medical records-but we need to do it right.”    
(Anderson, 2010) 
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Table  1: 
Date Board Undertaking 
14 08 2010 Birmingham Children’s Hospital NHS 
Trust 
1.Theft of two laptops containing 17 patients details 
15 06 2010 NHS Stoke on Trent 1.2,000 record missing from paper file system 
22 01 2010 Southampton University Hospital Trust 1.Theft of laptop containing 33,000 patient details 
13 11 2009 Great Yarmouth and Waveney NHS Pri-
mary Care Trust 
1.Theft of two desktop PC’s containing 1,000 details of pa-
tients and staff 
11 11 2009 Maidstone and Tunbridge wells NHS Trust 1.Theft of unencrypted laptop containing 33 patient details 
and others over a period form 2003-2006. 
14 09 2009 NHS Grampian 1.Email distribution of an individual’s records 
2.loss of 200 patient/staff records 
3.theft laptop 1500 patient records 
08 09 2009 NHS Education Scotland 1.Theft of laptop containing details of 6377 individuals 
28 08 2009 NHS Lothian 1. Temporary loss of 25 records 
2. Loss USB Stick 137 patient details 
14 08 2009 East Cheshire NHS Trust 1.Patient register containing details of 60 patients found in a 
garden 
2. Open skip used to destroy records 
12 08 2009 Gripping Valley Practice 1.Practice Server found in car park with patient and em-
ployee details 
29 07 2009 Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 1.Theft of 6 laptops containing 6,000 patient details 
15 07 2009 Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust  1.Loss of ward handover sheet with 23 patient details 
2.Theft of two laptops containing 80 patient details 
15 07 2009 Chelsea and Westminster NHS Hospitals 
Trust 
1.Theft of memory stick containing 143 patient details 
15 07 2009 Hampshire Partnership NHS Trust 1.Theft of a laptop containing 349 patients and 258 staff 
15 07 2009 Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust 1.Loss of disk containing 20,000 records 
15 07 2009 Epsom and ST Hellier University Hospi-
tals NHS Trust 
Insecure storage of patient data 
04 06 2009 Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust 1.Theft of laptop 3500 patient details 
30 04 2009 North West London Hospital 1.Theft of 2 laptops holding 181 patient details 
2. Theft PC 180 patient details 
07 04 2009 Stockport NHS Foundation Trust 1.Theft of laptop containing 1588 patient details 
07 04 2009 St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust 1.Laptop Computers stolen containing 22,000 patients 
23 03 2009 Camden Primary Care Trust 1.Loss of redundant computers containing details of 2,500 
patients 
05 02 2009 Brent Teaching Primary Care Trust 1.Theft of two laptops containing 389 patient details 
22 01 2009 Abertawe Bro Morgannwyg University 
NHS Trust 
1.Theft of laptop containing 5,000 patient details 
22 01 2009 Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Founda-
tion Trust 
1.Loss of USB stick, later handed to press, containing per-
sonal and staff details. 
20 01 2009 Southampton City Primary Care Trust 1.Loss of 168 employee payslips  
26 11 2008 NHS Lanarkshire 1.Personal data found in former hospital grounds 
26 11 2008 NHS Tayside 1.Personal data found in former hospital grounds 
22 10 2008 Kings College London 1.Theft of mac and several laptops containing 45 patient 
details. 
2.Theft resulting in loss of 150 dental patients records 
 
 
 
